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A channel under simultaneous jamming and
eavesdropping attack—correlated random
coding capacities under strong secrecy criteria
Moritz Wiese, Janis No¨tzel, Holger Boche
Abstract
We give a complete characterization of the correlated random coding secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying
wiretap channels (AVWCs). We apply two alternative strong secrecy criteria, which both lead to the same multi-letter
formula. The difference of these criteria lies in the treatment of correlated randomness, they coincide in the case of
uncorrelated codes. On the basis of the derived formula, we show that the correlated random coding secrecy capacity
is continuous as a function of the AVWC, in contrast to the discontinuous uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity. In the
proof of the secrecy capacity formula for correlated random codes, we apply an auxiliary channel which is compound
from the sender to the intended receiver and arbitrarily varying from the sender to the eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper brings together two areas of information theory: the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) and the wiretap
channel. This leads to the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC): A sender would like to send information
to a receiver through a noisy channel. Communication over this channel is subject to two difficulties. First, there
is a second receiver, called an eavesdropper, which obtains its own noisy version of the channel inputs and should
not be able to decode any information. Second, the state of the channels both to the intended receiver as well as to
the eavesdropper can vary arbitrarily over time. Neither the sender nor the intended receiver know the true channel
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2state. For a blocklength n, this means that the probability of the intended receiver obtaining the output sequence
yn = (y1, . . . , yn) and the eavesdropper receiving zn = (z1, . . . , zn) given that xn = (x1, . . . , xn) was input to the
channel is contained in the family{
Unsn(y
n, zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Usi(yi, zi|xi) : s
n = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
n
}
. (1)
Here, S is the finite state set and {Us(·, ·|·) : s ∈ S} a family of stochastic matrices, which thus determines the
AVWC.
One could regard the varying channel states as determined by nature. However, we will interpret them as the
result of jamming from an intruder. So henceforth, we shall view the AVWC as a channel under two attacks at the
same time: one passive (eavesdropping), one active (jamming).
The study of correlated random coding capacities in their own right instead of as mathematical tools applied
in the proofs of uncorrelated coding capacity theorems is motivated by arbitarily varying channels (AVCs), which
are AVWCs without the eavesdropper. By uncorrelated codes, we mean that sender and receiver have agreed on
a procedure (f, φ) of data manipulation prior to transmission. Here, f is a possibly stochastic mapping from the
messages to the channel inputs of a fixed blocklength, φ reverts channel outputs into messages. For transmission,
each node separately executes its part of this procedure without relying on any further resources, in particular no
common resources. What we call correlated random coding is usually called random coding and has been used as
a mathematical tool ever since Shannon’s 1948 paper [22]. Operationally, it means that sender and receiver agree
on a family of deterministic codes {(fγ , φγ) : γ ∈ Γ}. Before communication, a random experiment following the
distribution µ on Γ is performed. The outcome, say γ, is revealed to sender and intended receiver which then apply
the deterministic code (fγ , φγ).
It was already observed by Blackwell, Breiman and Thomasian [7] that whether correlated randomness is available
to sender and receiver can be crucial when it comes to the AVC capacity. In fact, AVCs exhibit a dichotomy [1]:
Their capacity for deterministic coding either equals their capacity for correlated random coding or it equals zero.
Csisza´r and Narayan have identified the distinguishing property [12], called symmetrizability (a concept originally
introduced by Ericson [15]). Without the use of correlated random coding, a symmetrizable AVC is useless; no
message transmission is possible.
Thus one is led to regarding correlated randomness as an additional resource for communication. This resource
can make communication possible where it is impossible without. Of course, it is important that the jammer has
no access to this resource, i. e. that it does not know the outcome of the random experiment common to sender
and receiver. In this paper, we will apply two strong secrecy criteria and show that the corresponding capacities for
correlated random coding coincide. The first of these criteria is that
max
sn
∑
γ
I(M ∧ Zγsn)µ(γ) (2)
be small, where M is the message chosen uniformly at random and Zγsn is the eavesdropper’s output if the state
sequence is sn and the deterministic code (fγ , φγ) has been selected. This criterion was applied in [4], [20]. The
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3second, stronger one requires
max
sn
max
γ
I(M ∧ Zγsn) (3)
to be small. Both secrecy criteria assume that the eavesdropper knows the realization of the correlated randomness.
This means that we have to assume the active and passive attacks to be uncoordinated in the sense that the
eavesdropper does not inform the jammer about its knowledge of the correlated randomness.
We are not the first to study the capacity of the AVWC. A study of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel where
the channel to the eavesdropper is arbitrarily varying has been done in [18], [19]. Earlier approaches to the discrete
AVWC as defined in (1) can be found in [4], [20], which studied the secrecy capacity achieved by correlated random
coding and used (2) as secrecy criterion. In both papers, closed-form secrecy capacity results could only be given
after imposing additional conditions.
The main result of this paper will be a complete characterization of the correlated randoom coding secrecy
capacity under both criteria (2) and (3). The capacity formula we find is multi-letter. It was found in [4] for special
AVWCs where there is a “best channel to the eavesdropper” and reduces to a single-letter formula under certain
degradedness conditions as required in [20]. It is not clear whether a generally applicable single-letter formula
exists at all. Still, the multi-letter formula allows for the approximate computation of the secrecy capacity up to a
given complexity. However, this is not our main concern, so we do not provide any relation between complexity
and approximation goodness.
With the help of the multi-letter formula, it can also be shown that the correlated random coding secrecy capacity
is continuous in the channel. Thus small errors in the description of the family (1) do not have severe consequences
on the capacity. If the capacity formula were not continuous, the channel would in general have to be estimated
with infinite precision in order to meaningfully apply the capacity formula. The continuity of the correlated random
coding secrecy capacity becomes even more remarkable as very simple examples with |S| = 2 have been given in
[9] which show that the uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity is a discontinuous function of the AVWC.
For the achievability part of the capacity theorem, we follow Ahlswede’s strategy of deriving correlated random
coding achievability results for AVCs from uncorrelated coding capacity results for compound channels. (In contrast
to an AVC, a compound channel does not change its state during the transmission of a codeword.) This technique is
known as the “robustification technique”. Sender and receiver of an AVC randomly permute an uncorrelated code
for a certain compound channel induced by the AVC and thus obtain a correlated random code with negligibly
larger average error.
When applying the robustification technique to AVWCs, one has to take the secrecy criterion into account. As
seen in [4], this requires a “best channel to the eavesdropper” if one assumes the channel to the eavesdropper
to be compound as well. The central idea of our proof is to introduce the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap
channel (CAVWC). This channel is compound from sender to intended receiver and arbitrarily varying from sender
to eavesdropper. We derive the uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity of this channel. After robustification, this also
turns out to be the correlated random coding secrecy capacity of the AVWC.
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4We prove the achievability result for the CAVWC by random coding following Devetak [13]. This technique takes
a resolvability approach to proving secrecy, cf. the discussion of resolvability and “capacity-based” approaches by
Bloch and Laneman [8]. However, it does not follow an information spectrum approach like the techniques presented
in [8]. To our knowledge, those techniques have not yet been shown to be able to handle arbitrarily varying channels.
As the number of AVWC channel states grows exponentially with blocklength, very tight probability estimates have
to be obtained from random coding. Devetak’s method [13], originally in the language of quantum information
theory, provides such estimates and was already applied in [23] in a classical information theory setting.
In [10], an a priori upper bound on the amount of correlated randomness required to achieve the correlated random
coding secrecy capacity was found. Such a bound is necessary for the converse of the correlated random coding
secrecy capacity theorem for the AVWC. The reason for this is that the use of correlated randomness prohibits a
straightforward application of the data processing inequality.
In a follow-up work [21] to this paper, the AVWC correlated random coding secrecy capacity for the case that
the eavesdropper has no knowledge of the correlated randomness as well as the AVWC uncorrelated coding secrecy
capacity are studied.
Paper outline: In Section II, we set the notation and give basic definitions. In Section III we define the AVWC
and state the coding problem and the main result. Section IV discusses the main result of Section III. Section V
introduces the CAVWC mentioned in the introduction, states the CAVWC coding problem and the corresponding
secrecy capacity theorem. Section VI contains the proof of the achievability part of the coding theorem for the
CAVWC. The achievability part of the correlated random coding theorem for the AVWC is derived from the
achievability part of the coding theorem for the CAVWC in Section VII. Section VIII contains the converses. In
Section IX, a short discussion concludes the paper. Several proofs are collected in the appendices.
II. NOTATION AND BASIC DEFINITIONS
Logarithms denoted by log are taken to the base 2; correspondingly, we set exp(x) = 2x. The cardinality of a
finite set A is written |A|. For a subset E of A, we write Ec := A\E . The indicator function 1E assumes the value
1 for arguments contained in E and 0 else. For n-tuples contained in An, we write xn := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ An.
The set of probability measures on the finite set A is denoted by P(A). For P ∈ P(A), we define the n-fold
product measure Pn ∈ P(An) by Pn(xn) :=
∏
i P (xi). We write stochastic matrices {W (b|a) : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
with input alphabet A and output alphabet B as mappings W : A −→ P(B). A nonnegative measure on A is a
vector (µ(a))a∈A with µ(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A. A probability measure is a nonnegative measure. The total variation
distance of two nonnegative measures µ, ν on A is defined by ‖µ− ν‖ :=
∑
a∈A|µ(a)− ν(a)|.
If X¯, Y¯ are random variables, then we write the distribution of X¯ as PX¯ , the joint distribution of X¯ and Y¯ as
PX¯Y¯ and the conditional distribution of X¯ given Y¯ as PX¯|Y¯ .
For a sequence xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ An and a ∈ A, the number N(a|xn) indicates the number of coordinates
xi of xn with xi = a. The type of xn is the probability measure q ∈ P(A) defined by q(a) := N(a|xn)/n. The set
of all possible types of sequences of length n is denoted by Pn0 (A). For δ > 0 and an A-valued random variable
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5X¯ , we define the typical set T n
X¯,δ
⊂ An as the set of those xn ∈ An satisfying the two conditions∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a|xn)− PX¯(a)
∣∣∣∣ < δ for every a ∈ A,
N(a|xn) = 0 if PX¯(a) = 0.
For δ > 0, an A × B-valued random variable (X¯, Y¯ ) with joint distribution PX¯Y¯ and an element xn of An, we
define the conditionally typical set T n
Y¯ |X¯,δ
(xn) as the set of those yn ∈ Bn satisfying the two conditions∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a, b|xn, yn)− PY¯ |X¯(b|a) 1nN(a|xn)
∣∣∣∣ < δ for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B,
N(a, b|xn, yn) = 0 if PY¯ |X¯(b|a) = 0.
III. ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CHANNELS
Let A,B, C,S be finite sets. For every s ∈ S, let a stochastic matrix Ws : A → P(B) and another stochastic
matrix Vs : A → P(C) be given. For a number n and xn ∈ An, yn ∈ Bn, sn ∈ Sn, define
Wnsn(y
n|xn) :=
n∏
i=1
Wsi(yi|xi).
We denote the family {Wnsn : sn ∈ Sn, n = 1, 2, . . .} by W. In analogy to Wnsn(yn|xn), we define V nsn(zn|xn) for
zn ∈ Cn and denote the corresponding family {V nsn : sn ∈ Sn, n = 1, 2, . . .} by V. We sometimes prefer to write
V n(zn|xn, sn) instead of V nsn(zn|xn). We call the pair (W,V) an Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel (AVWC).
S is called the state set of (W,V).
Remark 1: One checks easily that the representation of an AVWC as a pair (W,V) is possible without losing
generality. In general, any state s ∈ S together with an input a ∈ A will lead to a joint output distribution
Us(·, ·|a). But the performance of any of the codes defined below is measured with respect to the marginal output
distributions Ws(·|a) and Vs(·|a). Thus for the purpose of this paper, all AVWCs with the same marginals W and
V are equivalent.
An uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code Kn for the AVWC (W,V) consists of a stochastic encoder E : {1, . . . , Jn} →
P(An) and a collection of mutually disjoint sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : 1 ≤ j ≤ Jn} whose union equals Bn. We abbreviate
Jn := {1, . . . , Jn}. Together with an AVWC (W,V), any uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code Kn defines a canonical family
F(Kn,W,V) := {M
n, Xn, Y nsn , Z
n
sn , Mˆ
n
sn : s
n ∈ Sn} (4)
of random variables, with Mn and Mˆnsn assuming values in Jn, the values of Xn in An, those of Y nsn in Bn, those
of Znsn in Cn, and such that for every sn ∈ Sn the distribution of (Mn, Xn, Y nsn , Znsn , Mˆnsn) equals
PMnXnY n
sn
Zn
sn
Mˆn
sn
(j, xn, yn, zn, ˆ) =
1
Jn
E(xn|j)Wnsn(y
n|xn)V nsn(z
n|xn)1Dˆ(y
n).
Recall that we incur no loss of generality by defining Y nsn and Znsn to be independent conditional on Xn, as the
joint distribution of Y nsn and Znsn will never play any role (cf. Remark 1). The average error of Kn is given by
e(Kn) := max
sn∈Sn
P[Mn 6= Mˆnsn ].
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6Definition 2: A non-negative number RS is an achievable uncorrelated coding secrecy rate for the AVWC (W,V)
if there exists a sequence (Kn)∞n=1 of uncorrelated (n, Jn)-codes such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS , (5)
lim
n→∞
e(Kn) = 0, (6)
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn) = 0. (7)
The uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity of (W,V) is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates RS and is
denoted by CS(W,V).
Note the different roles the families W and V play. W is an Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC) from a sender with
alphabet A to a receiver with alphabet B. Messages are supposed to be sent over this AVC in such a way that only
a small, asymptotically negligible average error is incurred. This is reflected in condition (6). This communication
is subject to an additional secrecy condition. An eavesdropper obtains a noisy version of the sender’s channel inputs
via the AVC V. Condition (7) guarantees secrecy no matter what the channel state is.
For given (n, Jn), we assume that the set of uncorrelated (n, Jn)-codes is indexed by the set Γn. That means
that the set of all uncorrelated (n, Jn)-codes (with given channel input and output alphabets A and B) has the form
{Kn(γ) : γ ∈ Γn}. For the uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code Kn(γ), with γ ∈ Γn, we write for the canonical family of
random variables
F(Kn(γ),W,V) = {M
n, Xn(γ), Y nsn(γ), Z
n
sn(γ), Mˆ
n
sn(γ) : s
n ∈ Sn, γ ∈ Γn}.
A correlated random (n, Jn)-code Krann for the AVWC (W,V) then is given by a finitely supported1 random
variable Gn on Γn independent of all canonical families of random variables F(Kn(γ),W,V). In other words, Gn
randomly chooses an uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code out of all possible ones and is independent of the message random
variable, the randomness in the chosen stochastic encoder and the channel noise. The average error e(Krann ) is
defined as
e(Krann ) := max
sn∈Sn
P[Mn 6= Mˆnsn(Gn)] = max
sn∈Sn
∑
γ∈Γn
P[Mn 6= Mˆnsn(γ)]PGn(γ),
where
∑
γ∈Γn
a(γ)PGn(γ) is short for the finite sum
∑
γ∈supp(Gn)
a(γ)PGn(γ).
In the case of correlated random codes, we consider two secrecy criteria, leading to two different notions of
achievable rate.
Definition 3: A non-negative number RS is called an achievable correlated random coding mean secrecy rate
1
“Finitely supported” means that the set supp(Gn) := {γ ∈ Γn : PGn (γ) > 0} called the support of Gn is finite.
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7for the AVWC (W,V) if there exists a sequence (Krann )∞n=1 of correlated random (n, Jn)-codes such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS , (8)
lim
n→∞
e(Krann ) = 0, (9)
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(Gn)|Gn) = 0. (10)
The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates for correlated random codes is called the correlated random coding
mean secrecy capacity of (W,V) and denoted by CmeanS,ran(W,V).
Definition 4: A non-negative number RS is called an achievable correlated random coding maximal secrecy rate
for the AVWC (W,V) if there exists a sequence (Krann )∞n=1 of correlated random (n, Jn)-codes such that (8) and
(9) hold and
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
max
γ∈supp(Gn)
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(γ)) = 0. (11)
The supremum of all achievable correlated random coding maximal secrecy rates is called the correlated random
coding maximal secrecy capacity of (W,V) and denoted by CmaxS,ran(W,V).
Remark 5: It is immediately clear that CmeanS,ran(W,V) ≥ CmaxS,ran(W,V).
The secrecy capacities for correlated random codes are characterized by a multi-letter formula, extending the
results of [4]. We set
R∗S(W,V) := lim
k→∞
1
k
sup
{U¯ ,X¯k,Y¯ kq ,Z¯
k
sk
}
(
min
q∈P(S)
I(U¯ ∧ Y¯ kq )− max
sk∈Sk
I(U¯ ∧ Z¯ksk)
)
(12)
where the supremum is over the set of families of random variables
{U¯ , X¯k, Y¯ kq , Z¯
k
sk : q ∈ P(S), s
k ∈ Sk} (13)
satisfying that U¯ assumes values in some finite subset of the integers, the values of X¯k lie in Ak, those of Y¯ kq in
Bk, those of Z¯ksk in C
k
, and such that for every q ∈ P(S) and sk ∈ Sk,
PU¯X¯kY¯ kq Z¯ksk
(u, xk, yk, zk) = PU¯ (u)PX¯k|U¯ (x
k|u)
(
k∏
i=1
[∑
s∈S
q(s)Ws(yi|xi)
])
V ksk(z
k|xk). (14)
PU¯ and PX¯k|U¯ may be arbitrary probability distributions and stochastic matrices, respectively.
Theorem 6: For the AVWC (W,V), we have
CmeanS,ran(W,V) = C
max
S,ran(W,V) = R
∗
S(W,V).
Remark 7: 1) It is shown exactly as in [5], using Fekete’s lemma [16], that the limit on the right-hand side of
(12) indeed exists. In fact, the limit can be replaced by a supremum, as the terms 1k sup(. . .) increase in k.
2) For given k, the cardinality of U can be restricted to |A|k. This can be proved almost exactly as in the proof
of [11, Theorem 17.11]. The supremum in (12) then becomes a maximum.
3) If for q ∈ P(S) we define Wq(b|a) :=
∑
s q(s)Ws(b|a), the conditional probability of Y¯ kq given X¯k in (14)
satisfies
PY¯ kq |X¯k(y
k|xk) =
k∏
k=1
Wq(yi|xi) =: W
k
q (y
k|xk).
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8The family {Wnq : q ∈ P(S), n = 1, 2, . . .} is a memoryless channel which does not change its state during
the transmission of a codeword. Such channels will appear later under the name of compound channel.
4) The work [21] following up on this paper makes use of the fact that
R∗S(W,V) = lim
k→∞
1
k
sup
{U¯,X¯k,Y¯q˜,Z¯k
sk
}
(
min
q˜∈P(Sk)
I(U¯ ∧ Y¯ kq˜ )− max
sk∈Sk
I(U¯ ∧ Z¯ksk)
)
(15)
= lim
k→∞
1
k
sup
{U¯,X¯k,Y¯q˜1 ,Z¯
k
q˜2
}
(
min
q˜1∈P(Sk)
I(U¯ ∧ Y¯ kq˜1)− max
q˜2∈P(Sk)
I(U¯ ∧ Z¯kq˜2)
)
, (16)
where the family of random variables in (16) is defined analogously to the family (13) with the difference
that the parameters q˜1, q˜2 range over all probability distributions on P(Sk) (in particular, not just the product
measures with constant marginals or the extremal Dirac distributions) and where for q˜1, q˜2 ∈ P(Sk)
PY¯ kq˜1 Z¯
k
q˜2
|X¯(y
k, zk|xk) =
(∑
sk
q˜1(s
k)W ksk (y
k|xk)
)(∑
sk
q˜2(s
k)V ksk(z
k|xk)
)
.
The family of random variables in (15) over which the supremum is taken is obtained by restricting the
parameters q˜2 in the family of random variables in (16) to the extremal Dirac measures, which means nothing
else than to take PZ¯k
sk
|X¯ as in (13). Similarly, by restricting the q˜1 to be product measures on Sk with constant
marginals, one can regard (13) itself as a restriction of the family in (15).
To prove the equalities (15) and (16), first note that due to the convexity of mutual information in the channel
nothing changes if maxsk∈Sk I(U¯∧Z¯sk) on the right-hand side of (15) is replaced by maxq˜2∈P(Sk) I(U¯∧Z¯kq˜2).
This proves equality in (16). It is also obvious that the right-hand side of (15) is a lower bound on R∗S(W,V).
That equality holds can be seen by inspection of the proof of the converse in Section VIII below. The main
reason is the fact that the average decoding error for AVC and AVWC is affine in the channel, as proved in
[11, Lemma 12.3]. More details on this can be found in Remark 17 after the proof of the converse.
The enlargement of the state space as in (15) and (16) can be interpreted as allowing randomized jamming
strategies. This does not affect the AVWC performance because the performance measures are robust against
this randomization (i. e. the average error is affine in the channel, mutual information between the message
and the eavesdropper’s output is even convex in the channel).
5) Comparison of the right-hand side of (12) with the capacity expressions derived in [8] suggests that the terms
minq∈P(S) I(U¯ ∧ Y¯
k
q ) are related to an inf-information rate for the AVC W and maxsk∈Sk I(U¯ ∧ Z¯ksk) to
a sup-information rate for the AVC V, see also [17]. However, as AVCs have not yet been treated in the
framework of the theory of information spectrum, this remains speculation for the time being.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THEOREM 6
A. Multi-letter vs. single-letter
The bound from Remark 7-2) on the size of U for fixed k does not give a general upper bound on the cardinality
of the auxiliary alphabet U . It could still be helpful in calculations of R∗S(W,V) if one knows from other arguments
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9that there exists a k0 such that, for k ≥ k0,
1
k
sup
{U¯,X¯k,Y¯ kq ,Z¯
k
sk
}
(
I(U¯ ∧ Y¯ kq )− max
sk∈Sk
I(U¯ ∧ Z¯ksk)
)
is sufficiently close to R∗S(W,V). From Remark 7-1) it follows that this approach would give a lower bound on the
secrecy capacity. Note that it is not at all clear whether a single-letter characterization of R∗S(W,V) is available.
In the case of the unavailability of a single-letter capacity expression, only approximate calculations of capacity
are possible.
That the above multi-letter characterization can lead to further insights into the nature of AVWCs can be seen
in Subsection IV-C, where the continuity of R∗S(W,V) in (W,V) is shown. To show this a priori, i. e. without
having the multi-letter expression for capacity, seems to be very hard. With the formula at hand, however, it can
be done. For the uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity, a similar study of continuity is performed in [21], also on
the basis of the multi-letter formula.
A single-letter formula for CmeanS,ran(W,V) has been given in [20] for AVWCs which satisfy certain conditions.
We now present these conditions and show that if they are satisfied, the formula found in [20] coincides with
R∗S(W,V), which then becomes single-letter.
The first condition of [20] is that (W,V) be strongly degraded with independent states. This means
• that S = S1 × S2 and that the families {W(s1,s2) : (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2} and {V(s1,s2) : (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2} of
stochastic matrices determining W and V satisfy W(s1,s2) = Ws1 and V(s1,s2) = Vs2 for all (s1, s2); and
• that for every q1 ∈ P(S1) and q2 ∈ P(S2), the matrix Vq2 should be a degraded version of Wq1 , where
Wq1 (y|x) =
∑
s1∈S1
Ws1(y|x)q1(s1), Vq2(z|x) =
∑
s2∈S2
Vs2(z|x)q2(s2),
and Vq2 is a degraded version of Wq1 if there exists a stochastic matrix Tq1q2 : B → C such that
Vq2(z|x) =
∑
y
Tq1q2(z|y)Wq1(y|x). (17)
(Observe: It is sufficient to require (17) to hold only for s2 ∈ S2 and q1 ∈ P(S1). The validity of (17)
for all q1 ∈ P(S1) and q2 ∈ P(S2) then follows upon setting Tq1q2(z|y) :=
∑
s2
q2(s2)Tq1s2(z|y) for all
y ∈ B, z ∈ C. Thus the function (q1, q2) 7→ Tq1q2 can without loss of generality be assumed to be linear in q2.
This is not possible for q1, as can be seen from analyzing Example 3 in [20].)
The second condition of [20] is essentially the best channel to the eavesdropper condition from [4], so we will
henceforth call it this way. It requires that there exists an s∗ ∈ S2 such that for all s2 ∈ S2, the channel Vs2 is
a degraded version of Vs∗ , with degradedness here defined analogously to (17). (The general definition of “best
channel to the eavesdropper” in [4], [20] does not require independent states.)
Corollary 1: If the AVWC (W,V) is strongly degraded with independent states and has a best channel to the
eavesdropper, then
R∗S(W,V) = max
{X¯,Y¯q1 ,Z¯s2}
(
min
q1∈P(S1)
I(X¯ ∧ Y¯q1)− max
s2∈S2
I(X¯ ∧ Z¯s2)
)
(18)
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where the maximum over {X¯, Y¯q1 , Z¯s2} is over families of random values satisfying
PX¯Y¯q1 Z¯s2 (x, y, z) = PX¯(x)Wq1 (y|x)Vs2 (z|x)
and where X¯ is an arbitrary A-valued random variable.
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. The amount of correlated randomness
Next we ask how many values the correlated randomness variable should attain with positive probability in order
for CmeanS,ran(W,V) and CmaxS,ran(W,V) to be achievable. This can be answered in an a priori fashion, so it can be
applied in the converse of Theorem 6.
Note that the definitions allow every kind of correlated randomness as long as it is finitely supported. In the
achievability proof of Theorem 6, we shall see that the uniform distribution on a set of cardinality n! is sufficient,
where n is the blocklength of the code. The size of this set can still be reduced considerably. For AVCs, the first
such reduction was presented by Ahlswede in [1], where he showed that |supp(Gn)| ≤ n1+ε is sufficient.
A stronger result has been found recently [10]. Its essence is that every secrecy rate RS < CmaxS,ran(W,V)
is achievable with no more than a finite amount of correlated randomness, given arbitrary upper bounds on the
average error and the mutual information between message random variable and eavesdropper output.
Lemma 8 ([10]): Let RS < CmeanS,ran(W,V) and λ, δ > 0. Then for every ε > 0 there exists a positive integer
L = L(RS , ε, λ, δ) such that for sufficiently large n there exists a correlated random (n, Jn)-code Krann satisfying
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS − ε, (19)
e(Krann ) ≤ λ, (20)
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(Gn)|Gn) ≤ δ, (21)
|supp(Gn)| ≤ L. (22)
An analogous statement holds for maxsn∈Sn I(Mn∧Znsn(Gn)|Gn) replaced by maxγ∈supp(Gn)maxsn∈Sn I(Mn∧
Znsn(γ)).
C. Model robustness and continuity
Here we study the continuity of the correlated random coding secrecy capacity function in the channel. Continuity
is an important property of a capacity function, a fact which is sometimes overlooked because single-letter formulas
usually are obviously continuous. The question becomes non-trivial in the case of a multi-letter capacity formula
like R∗S(W,V).
Suppose the capacity function were not continuous and assume that one estimates a channel which is close to a
point of discontinuity. Then this channel has to be estimated to a precision which might be higher than achievable in
the estimation process, or even higher than a computer can handle with reasonable effort. Otherwise, the capacity
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expression obtained from the formula is next to useless for this particular channel, as all of its values in the
neighbourhood of the estimated channel could be the correct one, and this range of possible values could take
on arbitrary form. From this point of view, the lack of continuity of a capacity function is more dramatic than
a lacking single-letter expression, because a multi-letter formula still allows an approximate calculation, whereas
approximation is not possible if the capacity function is discontinuous.
We shall show that the capacity functions CmeanS,ran(W,V) and CmaxS,ran(W,V) are continuous. The argumentation
relies on the fact that we have an explicit formula for these, as CmeanS,ran(W,V) = CmaxS,ran(W,V) = R∗S(W,V). It is
thus an example of the usefulness of a multi-letter formula.
Of course, the set of AVWCs with given in- and output alphabets has to be equipped with a metric in order to
be able to talk about the continuity of capacity in the channel. Let (W,V) and (W˜, V˜) be two AVWCs with input
alphabet A and output alphabets B, C for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Denote the
finite state space of (W,V) by S and the finite state space of (W˜, V˜) by S˜. We measure the distance of (W,V)
and (W˜, V˜) by what is called the Hausdorff distance of two sets.
For two stochastic matrices W, W˜ : A → B, we define
‖W − W˜‖o := max
a∈A
‖W ( · |a)− W˜ ( · |a)‖.
We define four asymmetric distances
dB,1(W, W˜) := max
s˜∈S˜
min
s∈S
‖Ws − W˜s˜‖o,
dB,2(W, W˜) := max
s∈S
min
s˜∈S˜
‖Ws − W˜s˜‖o,
and analogously define dE,1(V, V˜), dE,2(V, V˜) by replacing Ws, W˜s˜ in the above definitions by Vs, V˜s˜. Then the
Hausdorff distance between (W,V and (W˜, V˜) is defined by
d((W,V), (W˜, V˜)) := max
{
dB,1(W, W˜), dE,1(V, V˜), dB,2(W, W˜), dE,2(V, V˜)
}
.
One checks easily that this is an actual metric on the set of finite-state AVWCs with the corresponding alphabets
A,B, C.
Building on Theorem 6, we now state the central result concerning the continuity of the correlated random
capacities.
Theorem 9: R∗S(W,V) is continuous in (W,V) with respect to the metric d. Thus, CS,ran(W,V) and CˆS,ran(W,V)
are continuous functions of the channel.
The proof of this theorem only requires minor changes compared to that of [9, Theorem 2] where the continuity
the capacity of the corresponding compound wiretap channel is shown.
In contrast to the correlated random coding secrecy capacity, the uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity of AVWCs
is known to be discontinuous. This was shown in [9] with a very simple example on small alphabets and a state set
of no more than two elements. Hence the continuity of the correlated random coding secrecy capacity becomes even
more remarkable, especially as the previous subsection IV-B has shown that only very little correlated randomness
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is required to cause such a qualitative change of capacity functions. The exact characterization of the discontinuity
points of the uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity CS(W,V) is more intricate. It is discussed in depth in [21].
V. THE COMPOUND-ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CHANNEL
To establish Theorem 6, we use Ahlswede’s robustification technique [2]. It was developed to turn deterministic
codes for compound channels into correlated random codes for AVCs. It has already been applied in [4] to compound
and arbitrarily varying wiretap channels. The difference of this paper’s approach is that the channel from sender
to eavesdropper will always be arbitrarily varying. Therefore it is no longer necessary to assume the existence of
a best channel to the eavesdropper.
We now formalize the idea of having a compound channel from A to B and an arbitrarily varying channel
from A to C. Let R be any set. For every r ∈ R, let Wr : X −→ Y be a stochastic matrix. Set Wnr (yn|xn) =∏n
i=1Wr(yi|xi). Note that here, in contrast to the AVC, the channel state remains constant over time. This defines
a compound channel W := {Wnr : r ∈ R, n = 1, 2, . . .}. Together with the AVC V from the previous section, we
obtain the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (CAVWC) (W,V).
We apply uncorrelated (n, Jn)-codes for message transmission over (W,V). Together with (W,V), every (n, Jn)-
code defines a canonical family of random variables
F(Kn,W,V) := {(M
n, Xn, Y nr , Z
n
sn , Mˆ
n
r ) : r ∈ R, s
n ∈ Sn}, (23)
where Mn and Mˆnr assume values in Jn, the values of Xn lie in An, those of Y nr in Bn and those of Znsn in Cn
and where for any r ∈ R and sn ∈ Sn
PMnXnY nr ZnsnMˆnr
(j, xn, yn, zn, ˆ) =
1
Jn
E(xn|j)Wnr (y
n|xn)V nsn(z
n|xn)1Dˆ(y
n).
For the uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code Kn, the average error is defined as
e¯(Kn) := max
r∈R
P[Mn 6= Mˆnr ].
Definition 10: A nonnegative number RS is called an achievable secrecy rate for the CAVWC (W,V) if there
exists a sequence (Kn)∞n=1 of uncorrelated (n, Jn)-codes such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS ,
lim
n→∞
e¯(Kn) = 0,
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn) = 0. (24)
The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates is called the secrecy capacity of (W,V) and denoted by CS(W,V).
We are actually interested in a stronger, permutation invariant form of secrecy. This is because we mainly consider
CAVWCs as an auxiliary channel model. We would like to exploit the achievability part of a coding theorem for
CAVWCs to find rates that are achievable for the AVWC by correlated random codes. This can be done using
Ahlswede’s robustification technique, which requires an exponential decrease of the average error and “permutation
invariance” of secrecy to be defined below.
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For a permutation π contained in the symmetric group Πn of permutations of {1, . . . , n}, denote by Epi the
stochastic encoder obtained from a stochastic encoder E via
Epi(xn|j) := E(π−1(xn)|j). (25)
Here, π(xn) = (xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)) for any xn ∈ An. The corresponding decoding sets are Dpij := {π(yn) : yn ∈ Dj}.
This family of codes together with (W,V) induces a canonical permutation-invariant family of random variables
F(Kn,W,V,Πn) := {(M
n, Xn(π), Y nr (π), Z
n
sn(π), Mˆ
n
r (π)) : r ∈ R, s
n ∈ Sn, π ∈ Πn}, (26)
where Mn and Mˆnr (π) assume values in Jn, the values of Xn(π) lie in An, those of Y nr (π) in Bn and those of
Znsn(π) in Cn and where for any r ∈ R and sn ∈ Sn and π ∈ Πn
PMnXn(pi)Y nr (pi)Znsn (pi)Mˆnr (pi)
(j, xn, yn, zn, ˆ) =
1
Jn
Epi(xn|j)Wnr (y
n|xn)V nsn(z
n|xn)1Dπ
ˆ
(yn).
For every permutation, we have P[Mn 6= Mˆn(π)] = P[Mn 6= Mˆn(id)], where id denoted the identity permutation.
Thus also in the permutation-invariant setting, we can still just write e¯(Kn) for the average error of Kn.
Definition 11: A nonnegative number RS is called an achievable permutation invariant secrecy rate for the
CAVWC (W,V) if there exists a sequence (Kn)∞n=1 of uncorrelated (n, Jn)-codes and a β > 0 such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS , (27)
lim sup
n→∞
−
1
n
log e¯(Kn) ≥ β, (28)
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
max
pi∈Πn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(π)) = 0. (29)
The supremum of all achievable permutation invariant secrecy rates is called the permutation invariant secrecy
capacity of (W,V) and denoted by Cpi-invS (W,V).
Theorem 12: The permutation invariant secrecy capacity Cpi-invS (W,V) and the secrecy capacity CS(W,V) of
the CAVWC (W,V) both equal
R∗S(W,V) := lim
k→∞
1
k
sup
{U¯,X¯k,Y¯ kr ,Z¯
k
sk
}
(
min
r∈R
I(U¯ ∧ Y¯ kr )− max
sk∈Sk
I(U¯ ∧ Z¯ksk)
)
,
where the supremum is over the set of families of random variables
{U¯ , X¯k, Y¯ kr , Z¯
k
sk : r ∈ R, s
k ∈ Sk}
satisfying that U¯ assumes values in a finite subset of the integers, the values of X¯k lie in Ak , those of Y¯ kr in Bk,
those of Z¯ksk in C
k
, and such that for every r ∈ R and sk ∈ Sk ,
PU¯X¯kY¯ kr Z¯ksk
(u, xk, yk, zk) = PU¯ (u)PX¯k|U¯ (x
k|u)W kr (y
k|xk)V ksk(z
k|xk).
PU¯ and PX¯|U¯ may be arbitrary probability distributions and stochastic matrices, respectively.
Remarks 7-1), 7-2), 7-4) and 7-5) apply here as well.
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VI. ACHIEVABILITY PART OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 12
A. Reduction
• As Cpi-invS (W,V) ≤ CS(W,V), it is sufficient to show that R∗S(W,V) is an achievable permutation invariant
secrecy rate for (W,V).
• Call RS ≥ 0 an achievable secrecy rate with exponentially decreasing error for the CAVWC (W,V) if there
exists a sequence (Kn)∞n=1 of uncorrelated (n, Jn)-codes and a β > 0 such that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS , (30)
lim sup
n→∞
−
1
n
log e¯(Kn) ≥ β, (31)
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn) = 0, (32)
where Mn and the Znsn are the corresponding elements of F(Kn,W,V). It is sufficient to prove that R∗S(W,V)
is an achievable secrecy rate with exponentially decreasing error for (W,V). This is due to the following lemma.
Lemma 13: Let Kn be an uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code with stochastic encoder E. Let Mn be the canonical
message random variable and {Znsn(π) : sn ∈ Sn, π ∈ Πn} the family of canonical eavesdropper output random
variables from F(Kn,W,V,Πn). Let id be the identity permutation mapping each element of {1, . . . , n} to
itself. If there exists an ε > 0 such that
max
sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(id)) ≤ ε, (33)
then
max
pi∈Πn
max
sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(π)) ≤ ε. (34)
Lemma 13 is proved in Appendix B and bases on the fact that PMnpi(Zn
sn
(id)) = PMnZn
π(sn)
(pi).
• R∗S(W,V) is an achievable secrecy rate with exponentially decreasing error if, for every CAVWC (W,V),
the rate
R†S(W,V) := max
{X¯,Y¯r ,Z¯q}
(
min
r∈R
I(X¯ ∧ Y¯r)− max
q∈P(S)
I(X¯ ∧ Z¯q)
)
, (35)
is an achievable secrecy rate with exponentially decreasing error for (W,V), where the maximum is over
families of random variables {X¯, Y¯r, Z¯q : r ∈ R, q ∈ P(S)}, with X¯ an arbitrary random variable assuming
values in A, the values of Y¯r in B, those of Z¯q in C, and
PX¯Y¯rZ¯q (x, y, z) = PX¯(x)Wr(y|x)
(∑
s∈S
q(s)Vs(z|x)
)
.
This is proved using a standard channel prefixing argument, see Appendix C.
B. R†S(W,V) is an achievable secrecy rate with exponentially decreasing error
The proof that R†S(W,V) is an achievable secrecy rate with exponentially decreasing error for (W,V) follows a
random coding strategy. The random codewords are chosen as follows. Fix a blocklength n and a family {X¯, Y¯r, Z¯q :
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r ∈ R, q ∈ P(S)} as in the definition of R†S(W,V). For arbitrary τ > 0, set2
Jn :=
⌊
exp
{
n
(
min
r∈R
I(X¯ ∧ Y¯r)− max
q∈P(S)
I(X¯ ∧ Z¯q)− τ)
}⌋
, (36)
Ln :=
⌊
exp
{
n max
q∈P(S)
I(X¯ ∧ Y¯r) +
τ
4
}⌋
.
and define Jn = {1, . . . , Jn} and Ln := {1, . . . , Ln}. Further, for some δ > 0 to be chosen later, we define a
family X := {Xjl : j ∈ Jn, l ∈ Ln} of random codewords in Xn with distribution
P[Xjl = x
n] := P ′(xn) :=
Pn
X¯
(xn)
Pn
X¯
(T n
X¯,δ
)
1T n
X¯,δ
(xn).
Via X , we obtain a randomly selected stochastic encoder
EX (xn|j) :=
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
1{Xjl}(x
n). (37)
1) Reliability: With high probability, a realization of EX determines an uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code Krann for the
compound channel W with exponentially small average error.
Lemma 14: For sufficiently small δ > 0 there exists a τ6 > 0 such that, if n is sufficiently large, there exist
decoding sets {DXj : j ∈ Jn} depending on X such that the event
ι3 :=

supr∈R
1
Jn
∑
j
∑
xn
EX (xn|j)Wnr ((D
X
j )
c|xn) ≤ 2−nτ6


has probability at least 1− 2−nτ6 .
As the probability distribution of X is not completely standard, we include a proof of this lemma in Appendix
E, although it does not differ much from the proof in [6]. The proof shows that the receiver can even decode the
randomization index l in addition to the messages.
2) Secrecy: KXn also satisfies the secrecy condition (32) with high probability. Recall that every realization of
X together with the decoding sets {DXj : j ∈ Jn} from Lemma 14 gives rise to a canonical family of random
variables F(KXn ,W,V) = {Mn, Xn, Y nr , Znsn , Mˆnr : r ∈ R, sn ∈ Sn} as in (4). The dependence of these random
variables on X is suppressed in the notation.
Lemma 15: For δ > 0 sufficiently small, there exist τ1, τ2 > 0 such that if n is large enough, there exists a
family {Θsn : sn ∈ Sn} of finite measures on Cn such that the probability of the event
ι0 :=
{
max
j∈Jn
max
sn∈Sn
‖PZn
sn
|Mn( · |j)−Θsn(·)‖≤ 2
−τ1n
}
is at least 1− 2−τ2n. (Note that PZn
sn
|Mn( · |j) is a random variable depending on X .)
This lemma is proved in Appendix F.
Corollary 2: For δ > 0 small enough and n large enough, for the τ1, τ2 from Lemma 15, the probability of the
event
ι′0 :=
{
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn) ≤ 2
−
τ1
2 n
}
2Recall that we use the convention exp(x) = 2x .
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is at least 1− 2−τ2n. (Note again that the joint distribution of Znsn and Mn is a random variable depending on X .)
Corollary 2 immediately follows from Lemma 15 and the uniform continuity of mutual information in total
variation distance [11, Lemma 2.7].
3) Synthesis of reliability and secrecy: Lemma 14 and Corollary 2 show that the probability that KXn satisfies
(30)-(32) is positive, so a realization satisfying (30)-(32) for β = τ ′1 and RS = R†S(W,V)−τ must exist. As τ > 0
was arbitrary, this proves that R†S(W,V) is an achievable secrecy rate with exponentially decreasing error.
VII. PROOF OF THE ACHIEVABILITY PART OF THEOREM 6
Here we prove that R∗S(W,V) is a lower bound to CmaxS,ran(W,V) and thus by Remark 5 also to CmeanS,ran(W,V).
We apply the achievability part of Theorem 12 proved in the previous section to a special CAVWC (W,V). Its
determining compound part, the family of stochastic matrices describing communication between the sender and
the legitimate receiver, is given by {Wq : q ∈ P(S)}, where Wq :=
∑
s∈SWsq(s). We thus obtain W = {Wnq :
q ∈ P(S), n = 1, 2, . . .}. Observe that for R∗S(W,V) defined in (12), we have
R∗S(W,V) = R
∗
S(W,V).
Central to the proof is Ahlswede’s robustification technique:
Lemma 16 ([2]): If a function f : Sn → [0, 1] satisfies
∑
sn∈Sn
f(sn)q(s1) · · · q(sn) ≥ 1− ε (38)
for all q ∈ Pn0 (S) and some ε ∈ [0, 1], then
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
f(π(sn)) ≥ 1− 3 · (n+ 1)|S| · ε. (39)
Let now ε > 0. By Theorem 12 applied to the CAVWC (W,V) defined above, there exists a β > 0 such that
for sufficiently large n, there exists an uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code Kn satisfying
1
n
log Jn ≥ R
∗
S(W,V)− ε = R
∗
S(W,V)− ε,
e¯(Kn) = max
q∈P(S)
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnq (D
c
j |x
n) ≤ 2−n(β−ε), (40)
max
sn∈Sn
max
pi∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(π)) ≤ ε. (41)
Define the function f by
f(sn) :=
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnsn(Dj |x
n).
It was already noted in Remark 7-4) that for any q ∈ Pn0 (S) and xn ∈ An and yn ∈ Bn∑
sn
Wnsn(y
n|xn)q(s1) · · · q(sn) = W
n
q (y
n|xn).
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Thus by (40)
∑
sn∈Sn
f(sn)q(s1) · · · q(sn) =
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
sn∈Sn
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnsn(Dj |x
n)q(s1) · · · q(sn)
=
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
sn∈Sn
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnq (Dj |x
n)
≥ 1− 2−n(β−ε).
Now we derive a correlated random (n, Jn)-code Krann from Kn. Let Epi be given by Epi(xn|j) := E(π−1(xn)|j)
and let Dpij := {π(yn) : yn ∈ Dj}. Further let Gn be uniformly distributed on this family indexed by Πn. One has
1− e(Krann ) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn
Epi
−1
(xn|j)Wnsn(D
pi−1
j |x
n)
=
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn
E(π(xn)|j)Wnsn(D
pi−1
j |x
n)
=
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn
E(xn|j)Wnsn(D
pi−1
j |π
−1(xn))
=
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn
E(xn|j)Wnpi(sn)(Dj |x
n).
With ε = 2−n(β−ε), Lemma 16 implies that the last term is lower-bounded by 1−(n+1)|S|2−n(β−ε) ≥ 1−2−n(β−2ε)
for sufficiently large n. This settles the reliability properties of Krann .
The secrecy properties of Krann are immediate, as (41) implies
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(π)) ≤ max
pi∈Πn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn(π)) ≤ ε
for every sn ∈ Sn. Hence R∗S(W,V) is an achievable correlated random coding maximal secrecy rate.
VIII. THE CONVERSES
One unusual difficulty arises in the proof of the converse of Theorem 6. This difficulty consists in the fact that
the common randomness prohibits a “naive” application of the data processing inequality. It is thus necessary to
limit the amount of common randomness of an arbitrary correlated random code in order to overcome this difficulty.
This has already been done in Lemma 8.
Let RS < CmeanS,ran(W,V). From Lemma 8 we know that for every ε > 0 there is an L = L(RS , ε) such that for
sufficiently large n there is a correlated random (n, Jn)-code Krann satisfying
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS − ε, (42)
e(Krann ) ≤ ε, (43)
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn |Gn) ≤ ε, (44)
|supp(Gn)| = L(RS , ε). (45)
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By [11, Lemma 12.3], the average error incurred by any uncorrelated code Kn used over the AVC W equals the
average error of Kn over the AVC determined by the convex hull of {Ws : s ∈ S}, i. e. the AVC {Wnqn : qn ∈
P(S)n, n = 1, 2, . . .}, where
Wnqn(y
n|xn) :=
n∏
i=1
∑
si∈S
Wsi(yi|xi)qi(si).
This is a simple consequence of the fact that the average error is affine in the channel and carries over to correlated
random codes. Hence (43) implies
max
qn∈P(S)n
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
γ∈Γn
∑
xn∈An
Eγ(xn|j)Wnqn
(
(Dγj )
c|xn
)
PGn(γ) ≤ ε. (46)
From (46), one infers that the average error of Krann for transmission over the compound channel W is upper-bounded
by ε as well, i. e.
max
q∈P(S)
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
γ∈Γn
∑
xn∈An
Eγ(xn|j)Wnq
(
(Dγj )
c|xn
)
PGn(γ) ≤ ε. (47)
Due to Fano’s inequality [11, Lemma 3.8], (47) implies for every q ∈ P(S)
H(Mn|Mˆnq , Gn) =
∑
γ∈supp(Gn)
H(Mn|Mˆnq , Gn = γ)PGn(γ)
≤ 1 +
∑
γ∈supp(Gn)
P[Mn 6= Mˆnq |Gn = γ]PGn(γ) log Jn
= 1 + ε logJn.
Here the Mˆnq are the random variables from the canonical family F(Krann ,W,V) defined in (23). Hence the
independence of Mn and Gn yields
log Jn = H(M
n) = H(Mn|Gn) = I(M
n ∧ Mˆnq |Gn) +H(M
n|Mˆnq , Gn) ≤ I(M
n ∧ Mˆnq |Gn) + 1 + ε logJn,
so by rearranging and taking (44) into account, we have for every q ∈ P(S) and sn ∈ Sn
(1− ε) log Jn ≤ I(M
n ∧ Mˆnq |Gn)− I(M
n ∧ Znsn |Gn) + 1 + ε.
We have to get rid of Gn in some way. The only reasonable way to achieve this seems to be through the use of
the convexity of the mutual information in the channel argument. But while this is a valid choice for the “secrecy
term”, it is certainly invalid for the “legal” term. This is due to the fact that Gn is independent of Mn, but not
of Mˆnq or Y nq . An application of the data processing inequality is thus only possible conditioned on Gn. It is
here where the importance of Lemma 8 becomes evident: The cardinality of the support of Gn is bounded and
independent of n for n sufficiently large, hence we can write
I(Mn ∧ Mˆnq |Gn) = H(M
n)−H(Mn|Y nq , Gn)
≤ H(Mn)−H(Mn|Y nq ) +H(Gn)
≤ I(Mn ∧ Y nq ) + logL(RS , ε),
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where we employed the fact that H(S) ≤ H(S, T ) = H(S|T ) +H(T ). Thus if n is sufficiently large, we obtain
that
1
n
log Jn ≤
1
n(1− ε)
(
min
q∈P(S)
I(Mn ∧ Mˆnq |Gn)− max
sn∈Sn
(Mn ∧ Znsn |Gn) + 1 + ε
)
≤
1
n(1− ε)
(
min
q∈P(S)
I(Mn ∧ Y nq )− max
sn∈Sn
I(Mn ∧ Znsn)
)
+
logL(RS , ε) + 1 + ε
n(1− ε)
. (48)
For n sufficiently large, as L(RS , ε) is independent of n, the second term of (48) is upper-bounded by ε. If we set
U¯ := Mn and X¯n := Xn and Y¯ nq := Y nq and Z¯nsn := Znsn , the joint distributions
PU¯X¯nY¯ nq (j, x
n, yn) =
1
Jn
∑
γ∈Γn
PGn(γ)E
γ(xn|j)Wnq (y
n|xn),
PU¯X¯nZ¯n
sn
(j, xn, zn) =
1
Jn
∑
γ∈Γn
PGn(γ)E
γ(xn|j)V nsn(z
n|xn)
have the form required in the definition of R∗S(W,V), and the shared randomness is now completely reduced to
randomness at the encoder. Thus by (42) and as ε was arbitrary, we have RS ≤ R∗S(W,V), hence CmeanS,ran(W,V) ≤
R∗S(W,V), and therefore also CmaxS,ran(W,V) ≤ R∗S(W,V). This completes the proof of the converse of Theorem
6.
Remark 17: As the average error is affine in the channel, one can even pass to a maximum over q˜ ∈ P(Sn) in
(46). Skipping the reduction to q ∈ P(S) in (47) and directly applying Fano’s inequality, the rest of the proof can
be performed as above for every q˜ ∈ P(Sn) using random variables Y nq˜ = Y¯ nq˜ defined by
PY nq˜ |Xn(y
n|xn) =
∑
sn
q˜(sn)Wnsn(y
n|xn).
This shows that the right-hand side of (15) upper-bounds CmeanS,ran(W,V) = R∗S(W,V). Since the right-hand side
of (15) trivially is a lower bound on R∗S(W,V), as noted in Remark 7-4), we can conclude the validity of equality
(15).
The converse for Theorem 12 follows the same lines. It is simpler as no common randomness has to be considered.
IX. DISCUSSION
The main result of this paper is the correlated random coding secrecy capacity of the AVWC for the case where
the eavesdropper is allowed access to the correlated randomness shared by sender and intended receiver. Applying
Ahlswede’s robustification technique, the main problem was solved via reduction to the secrecy capacity problem
of the CAVWC, which is compound between the sender and the intended receiver and arbitrarily varying between
the sender and the eavesdropper.
The secrecy capacity formula obtained in the main theorem is a multi-letter formula. Of course, this makes a
direct computation impossible. On the other hand, it is not known whether a general, computable, single-letter
formula exists at all. For a given AVWC, the value of the multi-letter formula can be approximated by restricting
computation to a finite number of letters. An open problem not addressed in this paper is the goodness of finite-letter
approximation.
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However, the use of a capacity formula is much larger than just to calculate the capacity. It can be applied
in the in-depth analysis of the channels in question. For example, using nothing but the capacity formula, it can
be shown for discrete memoryless channels that the capacity of parallel channels is the sum of their capacities.
For the AVWC, an analysis of the capacity formula shows that the correlated random coding secrecy capacity is
continuous in the AVWC, which is impossible to derive a priori. This result is of great engineering importance
because it ensures that small variations in the channel data cannot lead to completely different secrecy capacities.
This is very reassuring, as lots of resources would otherwise have to be spent on channel estimation. In fact, the
necessary precision of the channel estimate would grow without limits the closer the channel would be to a point
of discontinuity of the secrecy capacity function.
Follow-up work on the AVWC correlated random coding secrecy capacity for the case that the eavesdropper has
no knowledge of the correlated randomness as well as the AVWC uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity is presented
in [21].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
It is obvious that the right-hand side of (18) is upper-bounded by R∗S(W,V), see Remark 7-1). Thus it remains to
show the converse relation. Let k be a positive integer and let {U¯ , X¯, Y¯ kq1 , Z¯
k
sk} be a family of random variables as in
the definition of R∗S(W,V). The existence of a best channel to the eavesdropper guarantees that I(U∧Zksk2 ) ≤ I(U∧
Zks∗) for every s
k
2 ∈ S
k
2 , where PZ¯ks∗ |X¯(z
k|xk) =
∏k
i=1 Vs∗(zi|xi). In particular, I(U∧Zks∗) = maxs2∈S2 I(U∧Z
k
sk2
).
Therefore
1
k
(
min
q1∈P(S1)
I(U¯ ∧ Y¯ kq1)− max
sk2∈S
k
2
I(U¯ ∧ Z¯ksk)
)
=
1
k
min
q1∈P(S1)
(
I(U¯ ∧ Y¯ kq1 )− I(U¯ ∧ Z¯
k
s∗)
)
≤
1
k
min
q1∈P(S1)
I(U¯ ∧ Y¯ kq1 |Z¯
k
s∗), (49)
where strong degradedness was applied in (49). In a similar fashion as in the derivation of (23)-(26) in [20], one can
rewrite the right-hand side of (49) as I(X¯∗ ∧ Y¯ ∗q1 |Z¯∗s∗), where X¯∗ is a random variable on A and the distributions
of Y¯ ∗q1 and Z¯
∗
s∗ satisfy PY¯ ∗q1 |X¯∗ = Wq1 and PZ¯∗s∗ |X¯∗ = Vs∗ . Again using the strong degradedness of (W,V) and
the existence of a best channel to the eavesdropper and defining Z¯∗s2 by its conditional distribution PZ¯∗s2 |X¯∗ = Vs2
for every s2 ∈ S2, one obtains
min
q1∈P(S1)
I(X¯∗ ∧ Y¯ ∗q1 |Z¯
∗
s∗) ≤ minq1∈P(S1)
(
I(X¯∗ ∧ Y¯ ∗q1)− I(X¯
∗ ∧ Z¯∗s∗)
)
= min
q1∈P(S1)
I(X¯∗ ∧ Y¯ ∗q1)− maxs2∈S2
I(X¯∗ ∧ Z¯∗s∗).
Inserting this in the definition of R∗S(W,V) shows that R∗S(W,V) is upper-bounded by the right-hand side of
(18), thus proving that (18) indeed is an equality. This proves Corollary 1.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 13
Assume Kn satisfies (33) and has stochastic encoder E. Recall that Epi is defined by Epi(xn|j) := E(π−1(xn)|j).
The random variables below are from the canonical permutation-invariant family F(Kn,W,V,Πn).
Lemma 18: For every π ∈ Πn, we have PMnpi(Znsn (id)) = PMnZnπ(sn)(pi).
Proof: Let j ∈ Jn and zn ∈ Cn. Then
P[Mn = j, π(Z
n
sn(id)) = z
n] = P[Mn = j, Z
n
sn(id) = π
−1(zn)]
=
1
Jn
∑
xn
E(xn|j)V nsn(π
−1(zn)|xn)
=
1
Jn
∑
xn
E(π−1(xn)|j)V nsn(π
−1(zn)|π−1(xn))
=
1
Jn
∑
xn
Epi(xn|j)V npi(sn)(z
n|xn)
= P[Mn = j, Z
n
pi(sn)(π) = z
n].
Now assume that (33) holds. Then
max
pi∈Πn
max
sn
I(Mn ∧ Z
n
sn(π)) = max
pi∈Πn
max
sn
I(Mn ∧ Z
n
pi(sn)(π))
(i)
= max
pi∈Πn
max
sn
I(Mn ∧ π(Z
n
sn(id)))
(ii)
≤ max
sn
I(Mn ∧ Z
n
sn(id))
≤ ε
where Lemma 18 was applied in (i) and the data processing inequality in (ii). Thus (33) implies (34).
APPENDIX C
CHANNEL PREFIXING
Assume for any CAVWC ( ˜W, V˜) that R†S(W˜, V˜ ) is achievable with exponentially decreasing error for (W˜, V˜ ).
We have to show that then for a given CAVWC (W,V), R∗S(W,V) also is an achievable rate with exponentially
decreasing error for (W,V). Choose a positive integer k, a finite subset U of the integers, and a stochastic matrix
T : U → P(Ak). For every r ∈ R and sk ∈ Sk, this induces stochastic matrices W˜r : U → P(Bk) and
V˜sk : U → P(C
k) defined by
W˜r(y
k|u) :=
∑
xk
T (xk|u)W kr (y
k|xk),
V˜sk (y
k|u) :=
∑
xk
T (xk|u)V ksk (z
k|xk).
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This induces families
W˜ := {W˜nr : r ∈ R, n = 1, 2, . . .},
V˜ := {V˜ nskn : s
kn ∈ (Sk)n, n = 1, 2, . . .},
and hence a CAVWC denoted by (W˜, V˜). The compound part of this channel also has R as its state set, the state
set of the eavesdropper channel equals Sk. By assumption, R†S(W˜, V˜) is an achievable rate with exponentially
decreasing error for (W˜, V˜). Thus there exists a β > 0 such that for every ε > 0 and sufficiently large n, one
obtains an (n, Jn)-code K˜n for (W˜, V˜) with canonical random family F(K˜n, W˜, V˜) = {M˜n, U˜n, Y˜ knr , Z˜knskn ,
˜ˆ
Mnr :
r ∈ R, skn ∈ (Sk)n} satisfying
1
n
log Jn ≥ R
†
S(W˜, V˜)− ε, (50)
−
1
n
log e¯(K˜n) ≥ β − ε, (51)
max
skn∈(Sk)n
I(M˜n ∧ Z˜knskn) ≤ ε. (52)
Now define the stochastic encoder E : Jn → P(Akn) through
E(xkn|j) :=
∑
un∈Un
E∗(un|j)T n(xkn|un).
Together with the decoding sets D∗j considered as sets Dj ⊂ Bkn, this defines an uncorrelated (kn, Jn)-code Kkn
for the CAVWC (W,V). Observe that, if F(Kkn,W,V) = {Mn, Xn, Y knr , Zknskn ,M
n
r : r ∈ R, s
kn ∈ Skn} is the
canonical random family of Kkn, then for every r ∈ Rn and skn regarded either as en element of Skn or (Sk)n,
the joint probability of (Mn, Y knr , Zknskn , Mˆknr ) equals that of (M˜n, Y˜ knr , Z˜knskn , ˜ˆMnr ).
It immediately follows that
1
kn
log Jn ≥
1
k
R†S(W˜, V˜)−
ε
k
,
−
1
kn
e¯(Kkn) ≥
β − ε
k
,
max
skn∈Skn
I(Mn ∧ Zknskn) ≤ ε.
Thus after optimization over T and k, it follows that R∗S(W,V) is an achievable secrecy rate with exponentially
decreasing error for (W,V).
APPENDIX D
TYPES AND TYPICAL SEQUENCES
The proofs require some facts about types and typical sequences. For reference, we include them here. A,B and
W, W˜ are generic sets/stochastic matrices.
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Lemma 19: Let X¯ be an A-valued random variable and let xn ∈ T n
X¯,δ
. Further let W : A −→ P(S). Then for
any B-valued random variable Y¯ with PY¯ |X¯ = W ,
|T nY¯ ,δ| ≤ exp{n(H(Y¯ ) + f1(δ))},
Wn(yn|xn) ≤ exp{−n(H(Y¯ |X¯)− f2(δ))} for all yn ∈ T nY¯ |X¯,δ(x
n)
with universal f1(δ), f2(δ) > 0 satisfying limδ→0 f1(δ) = limδ→0 f2(δ) = 0.
Lemma 20: Let δ > 0. Let (X¯, Y¯ ) assume values in A× B such that PY¯ |X¯ = W , for some W : A −→ P(B),
and let xn ∈ An. There exist a universal c′ > 0 and an n0 = n0(|A|, |B|, δ) ≥ 1 such that for n ≥ n0
PnX¯(T
n
X¯,δ) ≥ 1− 2
−nc′δ2 ,
Wn(T nY¯ |X¯,δ(x
n)|xn) ≥ 1− 2−nc
′δ2 .
Lemma 21: The cardinality of Pn0 (S) is upper-bounded by (n+ 1)|S|.
The proofs of Lemmas 19-21 can be found in e.g. [11]. A proof of the next lemma can be found in [5].
Lemma 22: Let (X¯, Y¯ ) and (X¯ ′, Y¯ ′) two pairs of A × B-valued random variables. Then for sufficiently small
δ > 0 and any positive integer n,
PnY¯ (T
n
Y¯ ′|X¯′,δ(x
n)) ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B| exp{−n(I(X¯ ′ ∧ Y¯ ′)− f3(δ))} (53)
for all x˜n ∈ T n
X¯′,δ
holds for a universal f3(δ) > 0 with limn→∞ f3(δ) = 0.
Note that the right-hand side of (53) does not depend on (X¯, Y¯ ), so one might wonder how sharp this bound is.
But we will apply the lemma in a case where X¯ = X¯ ′ and where PY¯ |X¯ and PY¯ ′|X¯′ may be close (see Appendix
E). Thus it turns out to give the correct upper bound.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 14
The fact that the probability of e¯(KXn ) being small is large is well-known in principle, cf. [11]. As our choice
of codewords does not quite follow the standard approach and we use stochastic encoders, we present the proof
nonetheless. We start with a lemma which assumes a finite state set for W and actually shows that the sender can
also reliably decode the randomization index with high probability.
Lemma 23: Let R′ ⊂ R be finite. With
DˆXjl :=
⋃
r∈R
T nY¯r|X¯,δ(Xjl),
define
D˜Xjl := Dˆ
X
jl ∩
( ⋃
(j′,l′)∈Jn×Ln\{(j,l)}
DˆXj′l′
)c
.
In order for these decoding sets to cover the complete output space, we assume without loss of generality that D˜X11
contains all yn ∈ Bn not assigned to any message so far. This does not increase the average error. The D˜Xjl are
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pairwise disjoint ((j, l) ∈ Jn ×Ln). For τ ≥ τ0(δ), with τ0(δ)→ 0 as δ > 0, there exists an a = a(τ, δ) > 0 such
that the event
ι˜3 :=

maxr∈R′ 1JnLn
∑
(j,l)∈Jn×Ln
Wnr
(
(D˜Xjl )
c|Xjl
)
≤ 2−na


has probability at least 1− 2−na.
Proof: The disjointness of the decoding sets is obvious. We first show an upper bound on the mean error
incurred by KXn for given state r ∈ R′. More precisely, setting
er(K
X
n ) :=
1
JnLn
Jn∑
j=1
Ln∑
l=1
Wnr ((D˜
X
jl )
c|Xjl),
we claim
E
[
er(K
X
n )
]
≤ 2−na
′ (54)
for some a′ = a′(τ, δ) > 0 and for n sufficiently large. The left-hand side of (54) equals
E
[
Wnr ((D˜
X
11)
c|X11)
]
≤ E
[
Wnr ((Dˆ
X
11)
c|X11)
]
(55)
+
∑
(j,l)∈Jn×Ln:
(j,l) 6=(1,1)
E
[
Wnr (Dˆ
X
jl |X11)
]
. (56)
For (55), we have
E
[
Wnr ((Dˆ
X
11)
c|X11)
]
≤ E
[
Wnr ((T
n
Y¯r |X¯,δ
(X11))
c|X11)
]
,
which by Lemma 20 is upper-bounded by 2−nc′δ2 for n sufficiently large. Thus (55) is upper-bounded by the same
number. For each of the terms in (56), we obtain
E
[
Wnr (Dˆ
X
jl |X11)
]
≤
∑
r′∈R′
E
[
Wnr (T
n
Y¯r′ |X¯,δ
(Xjl)|X11)
]
.
For sufficiently large n, the terms on the right-hand side can be written (recall that (j, l) 6= (1, 1))
E
[
Wnr (T
n
Y¯r′ |X¯,δ
(Xjl)|X11)
]
=
∑
xn,x˜n∈T n
X¯,δ
Wnr (T
n
Y¯r′ |X¯,δ
(x˜n)|xn)P ′(xn)P ′(x˜n)
(i)
≤ (1− 2−nc
′δ)−2
∑
x˜n∈Tn
X¯,δ
PnY¯r (T
n
Y¯r′ |X¯,δ
(x˜n))PnX¯(x˜
n), (57)
where we used the definition of P ′ and Lemma 20 in (i). By Lemma 22,
PnY¯r (T
n
Y¯r′ |X¯,δ
(x˜n)) ≤ (n+ 1)|A||B|2−n(I(X¯∧Y¯r′ )−f3(δ)).
This immediately gives
(57) ≤ (1− 2−nc′δ)−2(n+ 1)|A||B|2−n(I(X¯∧Y¯r′)−f3(δ)),
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and we can upper-bound (56) by
|R′|JnLn exp
{
−n( min
r′∈R′
I(X¯ ∧ Y¯r′)− 2f3(δ))
}
.
If one chooses δ so small that τ ≥ 4f3(δ) > 0, this tends to 0 exponentially. Combining the bounds on (55) and
(56), we thus obtain (54) for some appropriate a′ > 0.
Using the Markov inequality and setting a := a′/3, we obtain from (54)
P
[ ⋂
r∈R′
{
er(K
X
n ) ≤ 2
−na
}]
≥ 1−
∑
r∈R′
P[er(K
X
n ) > 2
−na]
≥ 1− 2na
∑
r∈R′
E[er(K
X
n )] ≥ 1− |R
′|2na2−3na ≥ 1− 2−na
for sufficiently large n. Thus the probability that maxr∈R′ er(KXn ) ≤ 2−na is lower-bounded by 1 − 2−na. This
completes the proof.
We now appeal to the approximation argument of [6], from which we conclude that the same decoding sets induce
an exponentially decreasing average error for the complete state set R with the same probability lower-bounded by
1− 2−na. This is still true for a non-stochastic encoder, the randomization index can still be decoded.
Now recall the definition of EX . Together with the decoding sets
DXj :=
⋃
l∈Ln
D˜jl,
for j ∈ Jn, this defines a randomly chosen uncorrelated (n, Jn)-code KXn . Note that
1
Jn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
xn
EX (xn|j)Wn((DXj )
c|xn) =
1
JnLn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
l∈Ln
Wn((DXj )
c|Xjl)
≤
1
JnLn
∑
j∈Jn
∑
l∈Ln
Wn((DˆXjl )
c|Xjl).
This last term is exponentially small with high probability by the previous considerations, which proves Lemma
14.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 15
Below we will define events ι1(j, zn, sn) and ι2(j, sn), for j ∈ Jn, zn ∈ Zn and sn ∈ Sn, and show that the
ι0 defined in Lemma 15 satisfies
ι0 ⊃
⋂
j,zn,sn
ι1(j, z
n, sn) ∩
⋂
j,sn
ι2(j, s
n). (58)
Then to show that P[ι0] > 1− 2−τ2n, it remains to prove that each of the events of the right-hand side of (58) has
a probability sufficiently close to 1.
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1) Definition of ι1(j, zn, sn): For some positive α to be chosen later, let εn := 2−nα. Fix sn ∈ Sn, and denote
its type by q ∈ Pn0 (S). For xn ∈ An, define
E1(x
n, sn) :=
{
zn ∈ T nZ¯q,4|A||S|δ : V
n
sn(z
n|xn) ≤ exp{−n(H(Z¯q|X¯)− f2(3|S|δ))}
}
,
where f2 is the function from Lemma 19, and set
Θ˜sn(z
n) := E[V nsn(z
n|X11)1E1(X11,sn)(z
n)]. (59)
Further define
E2(s
n) :=
{
zn ∈ T nZ¯q ,4|A||S|δ : Θ˜sn(z
n) ≥ εn|T
n
Z¯q,4|A||S|δ
|−1
}
and set
Θsn(z
n) := Θ˜sn(z
n)1E2(sn)(z
n).
Note that by definition, Θsn(zn) > 0 only if zn ∈ T nZ¯q,4|A||S|δ.
With the sets just defined, we obtain a modification of V nsn by defining
Qsn,zn(x
n) := V nsn(z
n|xn)1E1(xn,sn)(z
n)1E2(sn)(z
n).
Note that this is not an actual “channel” as in general
∑
zn Qsn,zn(x
n) < 1. Finally, we define
ι1(j, z
n, sn) :=
{
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qsn,zn(Xjl) ∈ [(1± εn)Θsn(z
n)]
}
,
where [(1± εn)Θsn(zn)] is short for [(1− εn)Θsn(zn), (1 + εn)Θsn(zn)].
2) Definition of ι2(j, sn): Let q ∈ Pn0 (S) be the type of sn and let S¯q be an S-valued random variable independent
of the family {X¯, Y¯r, Z¯q : r ∈ R, q ∈ P(S)} with PS¯q = q. Then we define
ι2(j, s
n) :=
{
|{l ∈ Ln : s
n ∈ T nS¯q|X¯,2δ(Xjl)}| ≥ (1− εn)(1 − 2
−nc′δ2)Ln
}
.
3) Proof of Lemma 15: The proof of Lemma 15 bases on three lemmas. The first one proves that (58) actually
is true.
Lemma 24: Assume a realization x := {xjl : j ∈ Jn, l ∈ Ln} of X has the following properties: For all j ∈ Jn
and zn ∈ Cn and q ∈ Pn0 (S) and sn ∈ Sn,
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qsn,zn(xjl) ∈ [(1± εn)Θsn(z
n)], (60)
|{l ∈ Ln : s
n ∈ T n
S¯q,2δ
(xjl)}|
Ln
≥ (1− εn − 2
−nc′δ2), . (61)
Then
max
j∈Jn
max
sn∈Sn
‖PZn
sn
|Mn( · |j)−Θsn(·)‖≤ 4(εn + 2
−nc′δ2).
In particular, (58) is true with τ1 = min{α, c′δ2}/2.
This lemma is proved in Appendix G. The next two lemmas bound the probabilities of the complements of the
ι1 and ι2 sets.
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Lemma 25: For sufficiently small δ > 0 there exists a τ3 > 0 such that for n large and every j ∈ Jn, zn ∈ Cn
and sn ∈ Sn
P
[
ι1(j, z
n, sn)c
]
≤ 2 exp
{
− exp
{
nτ3
}}
.
Lemma 26: For every j ∈ Jn and sn ∈ Sn,
P[ι2(j, s
n)] ≤ 2 exp
{
− exp
{
n( max
q∈P(S)
I(X¯ ∧ Z¯q) + τ5)}
}
for some τ5 > 0, provided that n is sufficiently large.
The proofs of Lemmas 25 and 26 can be found in Appendix G. They show that the probability of the complement
of each of the events ι1(j, zn, sn) and ι2(j, sn) is upper-bounded by a term which tends to zero doubly-exponentially
as the blocklength increases. Then
P[ι0] = 1− P[ι
c
0]
(i)
≥ 1− P

 ⋃
j,zn,sn
ι1(j, z
n, sn)c ∪
⋃
j,sn
ι2(j, s
n)c


(ii)
≥ 1− 2Jn|C|
n|S|n exp
{
− exp{nτ3}
}
− 2Jn|S|
n exp
{
− exp{n( max
q∈P(S)
I(X¯ ∧ Z¯q) + τ5)}
}
(iii)
≥ 1− 2−nτ1,
where (i) is due to (58), (ii) to the union bound and (iii) because an appropriate τ1 > 0 can be found due to the
doubly exponential decrease of the probabilities in Lemmas 25 and 26. Altogether, this proves Lemma 15.
APPENDIX G
PROOFS OF LEMMAS 24-26
A. Proof of Lemma 25
Let j ∈ Jn, zn ∈ Cn, sn ∈ Sn. We want to upper-bound the probability of the event that{
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qsn,zn(Xjl) /∈ [(1± εn)Θsn(z
n)]
}
.
The form of this event already suggests that a Chernoff bound may be the right method for the proof. Indeed, we
will apply the following lemma.
Lemma 27: Let b be a positive number. Let Z1, . . . , ZL be i.i.d. random variables with values in [0, b] and
expectation EZl = ν, and let 0 < ε < 12 . Then
P
{
1
L
L∑
l=1
Zi /∈ [(1 ± ε)ν]
}
≤ 2 exp
(
−L ·
ε2ν
3b
)
.
Proof: The proof can be found in [14, Theorem 1.1] and in [3].
The claim of Lemma 25 follows from an application of Lemma 27. Due to the definition of E1(xn, sn), the
random variables Qsn,zn(Xjl) are upper-bounded by exp{−n(H(Z¯q|X¯) − f2(3|S|δ))} and have mean Θsn(zn).
Lemma 19 implies that Θsn(zn) ≥ εn exp{−n(H(Z¯q) + f1(4|A||S|δ))}. Inserting this into the right-hand side of
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Lemma 27 and recalling the definition of εn gives the desired bound, with τ3 = τ/5−3α−f1(4|A||S|δ)−f2(3|S|δ).
This is positive if α and δ are sufficiently small. This proves Lemma 25.
B. Proof of Lemma 26
The proof also applies the Chernoff bound of Lemma 27. To do so, we need a lower bound on E[1T n
S¯q,2δ
(X11)] =
P[sn ∈ T n
S¯q,2δ
(X11)].
Lemma 28: For sufficiently large n and every sn of type q,
P[sn ∈ T nS¯q,2δ(X11)] ≥ 1− 2
−nc′δ2 .
Proof: We first show
T nX¯|S¯q,δ/|S|(s
n) ⊂ {xn ∈ T nX¯,δ : s
n ∈ T nS¯q,2δ(x
n)}. (62)
Let xn ∈ T n
X¯|S¯q,δ/|S|
(sn). Clearly T n
X¯|S¯q,δ/|S|
(sn) ⊂ T n
X¯,δ
. Then∣∣∣∣ 1nN(s, a|sn, xn)− PS¯q|X¯(s|a) 1nN(a|xn)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(s, a|sn, xn)− 1nN(s|sn) 1nN(a|xn)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(s, a|sn, xn)− PX¯|S¯q (a|s) 1nN(s|sn)
∣∣∣∣
+
1
n
N(s|sn)
∣∣∣∣PX¯(a)− 1nN(a|xn)
∣∣∣∣
≤
δ
|S|
+ δ ≤ 2δ.
This proves (62). For n large, we can use this to continue with
P[sn ∈ T nS¯q|X¯,2δ(X11)]
(i)
≥ P[T nX¯|S¯q,δ/|S|(s
n)] =
∑
xn∈T n
X¯|S¯q,δ/|S|
(sn)
p′(xn)
(ii)
≥
∑
xn∈T n
X¯|S¯q,δ/|S|
(sn)
PnX¯(x
n)
= PnX¯|S¯q (T
n
X¯|S¯q,δ/|S|
(sn)|sn)
(iii)
≥ 1− 2−nc
′δ2 ,
where we used (62) in (i), T n
X¯|S¯q,δ/|S|
(sn) ⊂ T n
X¯,δ
in (ii) and Lemma 20 in (iii).
Moving to the proof of Lemma 26, let j ∈ Jn. The i.i.d. random variables 1Tn
S¯q|X¯,2δ
(Xjl)(s
n) (l ∈ Ln) are upper-
bounded by 1. Their expectation ν was lower-bounded in Lemma 28 by 1 − 2−nc′δ2 . This implies that ι2(j, sn)c
is contained in the event {
1
Ln
|{l ∈ Ln : s
n ∈ T nS¯q|X¯,2δ(Xjl)}| ≤ (1− εn)ν
}
.
Lemma 27 thus implies that the probability of the above event is upper-bounded as claimed if n is large enough
upon setting τ5 := τ/4− 3α and letting α be small enough.
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C. Proof of Lemma 24
The next two lemmas are needed for the proof. Recall the convention that we sometimes write V (c|a, s) instead
of Vs(c|a).
Lemma 29: Let xn ∈ T n
X¯,δ
and let sn have type q ∈ Pn0 (S). Let the random variable Zq satisfy PZq|X¯S¯q (·|·, ·) =
V (·|·, ·). If sn ∈ T n
S¯q,2δ
(xn), then T n
Zq|X¯S¯q,δ
(xn, sn) ⊂ E1(x
n, sn).
Proof: For xn ∈ T n
X¯,δ
, we have T n
Z¯q |X¯,3|S|δ
(xn) ⊂ T n
Z¯q ,4|A||S|δ
. Thus due to Lemma 19, it suffices to show
that if sn has type q, then T n
Zq|X¯S¯q,δ
(xn, sn) ⊂ T n
Z¯q |X¯,3|S|δ
(xn). For a ∈ A and c ∈ C, we calculate∣∣∣∣∣ 1nN(c, a|zn, xn)−
∑
s∈S
q(s)V (c|a, s)
1
n
N(a|xn)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(c, a, s|zn, xn, sn)− q(s)V (c|a, s) 1nN(a|xn)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(c, a, s|zn, xn, sn)− V (c|a, s) 1nN(a, s|xn, sn)
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
s∈S
V (c|a, s)
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a, s|xn, sn)− q(s) 1nN(a|xn)
∣∣∣∣
≤ |S|(δ + 2δ) = 3|S|δ.
Corollary 3: If n is sufficiently large, then every sn ∈ Sn satisfies
Θsn(C
n) ≥ 1− 2 · 2−nc
′δ2 − εn
Proof: Let sn have type q ∈ Pn0 (S). By the definition of Θsn , we have Θsn(Cn) = Θsn(E2(sn)). As the
support of Θ˜sn is contained in T nZ¯q,4|A||S|δ, we have Θsn(E2(s
n)) ≥ Θ˜sn(T
n
Z¯q ,4|A||S|δ
)− εn = Θ˜sn(C
n)− εn. By
definition,
Θ˜sn(C
n) = E[V nsn(E1(X11, s
n)|X11)]
≥ E[V nsn(E1(X11, s
n)|X11)|s
n ∈ T nS¯q|X¯,2δ(X11)]P[s
n ∈ T nS¯q|X¯,2δ(X11)].
For sufficiently large n
E[V nsn(E1(X11, s
n)|X11)|s
n ∈ T nS¯q|X¯,2δ(X11)]
(i)
≥ E[V n(T nZq|X¯S¯q,δ
(X11, s
n)|X11, s
n)|sn ∈ T nS¯q|X¯,2δ(X11)]
(ii)
≥ 1− 2−nc
′δ2 ,
where we used Lemma 29 in (i) and Lemma 20 in (ii). Lemma 28 provides a lower bound on P[sn ∈ T n
S¯q|X¯,2δ
(X11)],
so altogether,
Θsn(C
n) ≥ Θ˜sn(C
n)− εn ≥ (1− 2
−nc′δ2)2 − εn ≥ 1− 2 · 2
−nc′δ2 − εn. (63)
August 21, 2018 DRAFT
30
Let x = {xjl : j ∈ Jn, l ∈ Ln} be a realization of X satisfying (60) and (61). Let Kn be the corresponding
code and F(Kn,W,V) = {Mn, Xn, Y nr , Znsn , Mˆr : r ∈ R, sn ∈ Sn} the canonical family of random variables
associated with Kn. For any sn with type q ∈ P0(S), we decompose the total variation distance as follows:
‖PZn
sn
|Mn( · |j)−Θsn(·)‖
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qsn, · (xjl)−Θsn(·)
∥∥∥∥∥ (64)
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nsn( · |xjl)1E1(xjl,sn)(·)(1Cn(·)− 1E2(sn)(·))
∥∥∥∥∥ (65)
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nsn( · |xjl)(1Cn(·)− 1E1(xjl,sn)(·))
∥∥∥∥∥ . (66)
The term in (64) is upper-bounded by εn, because due to (60)∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qsn, · (xjl)−Θsn(·)
∥∥∥∥∥
=
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qsn,zn(xjl)− Θsn(z
n)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ εn
∑
zn
Θsn(z
n)
≤ εn.
Next, applying (60) in (i), we upper-bound (65) as
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
∑
zn
Vsn(z
n|xjl)1E1(xjl,sn)(z
n)
−
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
∑
zn
Vsn(z
n|xjl)1E1(xjl,sn)(z
n)1E2(sn)(z
n)
≤ 1−
∑
zn
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qsn,zn(xjl)
(i)
≤ 1− (1− εn)Θsn(C
n).
Upon application of Corollary 3, we obtain that (65) can be upper-bounded by
1− (1− εn)(1− 2 · 2
−nc′δ2 − εn) ≤ 2(2
−nc′δ + εn).
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It remains to upper-bound (66). Recall the definition of Zq . We have∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nsn( · |xjl)(1Cn(·)− 1E1(xjl,sn)(·))
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nsn(E1(xjl, s
n)c|xjl) (67)
=
1
Ln
∑
l∈Ln:
T n
Zq|X¯S¯q,δ
(xjl,s
n)⊂E1(xjl,s
n)
V nsn(E1(xjl, s
n)c|xjl)
+
1
Ln
∑
l∈Ln:
T n
Zq|X¯S¯q,δ
(xjl,s
n)*E1(xjl,sn)
V nsn(E1(xjl, s
n)c|xjl).
If T n
Zq|X¯S¯q,δ
(xjl , s
n) ⊂ E1(xjl, s
n), then by Lemma 20, we have
V nsn(E1(xjl, s
n)c|xjl) ≤ V
n(T nZq|X¯S¯q,δ
(xjl , s
n)c|xjl, s
n) ≤ 2−nc
′δ2 .
By Lemma 29 and (61), the proportion of those j for which T n
Zq|X¯S¯q,δ
(xjl, s
n) * E1(xjl , sn) holds is upper-bounded
by εn + 2−nc
′δ2
. We can thus bound (67) by
2−nc
′δ2 + εn + 2
−nc′δ = εn + 2 · 2
−nc′δ2 .
Collecting the bounds on (64), (65) and (66) completes the proof of Lemma 24.
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